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Abstract
This paper explores the phenomenological possibility of transcending the impoverished
ontological state of contemporary "standardized" education (social efficiency), which
forecloses original ways of Being-and-learning. Focused on the notion of
phenomenological self-hood, I elucidate a fundamental educational theory, which holds the
potential of inspiring a renewed conception of curriculum design and praxis.
Envisioning a reconceived notion of world and human being, I look to the realm of
"absorbed coping," a mode of Being-in-the-world that antedates both practical
comportment and theoretical comportment. It is a mode of existence wherein we
literally "learn" to respond to the "address" of world and others. Building
hermeneutically on this analysis, a fundamental theory of education emerges, which is
grounded ontologically in the "lived experience" of "pre-theoretical" comportment.
Ultimately, I reveal the essential aim of education for thematic analysis, which is the
human's primordial search for meaning. This, I claim, is an original form of Beingeducated, and beyond, it is the essential ontological-meaning-structure giving form to all
instances of learning and the theoretical manifestation thereof.
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Introduction
<1> As an educational researcher I am concerned with the following grounding
question: Can there be a fundamental educational theory grounded in ontology? My
rejoinder emerges from a critical engagement with contemporary phenomenological
studies in dialogue with the history of curriculum theorizing and the reading of
curriculum as phenomenological text. Working to develop the notion of a fundamental
educational theory inspired by a form of phenomenology emerging from a postHusserlian perspective, this paper unfolds in three sections: (i) I explicate for the reader
the impoverished ontological state of contemporary standardized education (social
efficiency), outlining the potential devastating effects of the learning sciences on the
Being of both educators and students, on phenomenological self-hood; (ii) I look to Hubert
Dreyfus (1981; 1992; 1999; 2001) in order to envision the reconceived notion of world
and human being that his unique and complex phenomenology offers, which is radically
opposed to the thematized world of contemporary education; drawing on Martin
Heidegger's (1962) fundamental ontology, Dreyfus provides us with a rich description of
the human immersed within the primordial realm of absorbed coping, which antedates
both practical comportment and theoretical comportment. It is a mode of existence

wherein we literally learn to respond to the address of world and others; and (iii) in
relation to Dreyfus' elucidation of primordial lived experience, I look to Donald
Vandenberg's (1971; 1974) phenomenology of education in order to speculate on the
possibility of a fundamental theory of education, which would find its grounds in
ontology, most particularly in the lived experience as described by Dreyfus that
Vandenberg understands in terms of pre-theoretical comportment. Vandenberg
wonders whether it is possible to envision a form of fundamental theory grounded in the
dialogic principle, phenomenology's intuitive scanning of lived experience via reflection,
description, and interpretation, in search of the essential aim of education, which for him
represents the human's primordial search for meaning - and it is this primordial search
for meaning emerging from an essential (ontological) meaning-structure “giving” the
conditions of the possibility for the original experience of “learning.”
<2> Phenomenology, as a qualitative research method in education, e.g., Max van
Manen (1990), George Willis (1991), and William Pinar (1994) generally unfolds as a
method in the following stages: (i) stage of gathering life experience as text; (ii) stage of
analysis, elucidating (describing/interpreting) common themes and patterns of
meaning; and (iii) stage of suggesting ways for inspiring improved educational practice.
Caution must be exercised when approaching the third stage of the phenomenological
method, lest we inevitably encounter a problem, namely, the susceptibility to fall prey to
two highly questionable beliefs: first, that phenomenology might somehow be able to
solve problems, and secondly, that theory, in a free-floating manner, lives at a remove
from praxis and further, can be applied to praxis in order to predict, control, and direct
it. This notion arises, in one sense, because of the conflation of scientific theory and
practical theory, and the latter represents the proper purview of educational theory,
because all practical theory can hope to do is offer speculative and tentative insight into
the things we should be doing in our practical involvements - praxis, it must be noted, is
a realm of danger and precarious uncertainty (Hans-Georg Gadamer, 1989; Nicholas
Davey, 2006; David Jardine, 1998). In relation to the first questionable belief, Heidegger
(1965) states that philosophy might not be able to accomplish anything, however, as he
assures us, if we approach it properly, with respect and reverence, perhaps, philosophy
might do something with us - and thus we must open ourselves up to the call or address
of philosophy, or, as in this case, phenomenology.
<3> The call of phenomenology, as Ted Aoki (2005) indicates, has unfortunately been
silenced in the era of social efficiency in contemporary education. This is quite properly an
issue of attunement, we are trapped in a way of seeing, understanding, interpreting, and
discoursing about our existence that restricts our vision (as visionary-seeing). We
experience education as a series of problems to be solved, students as products, and
worse, subjects in their manipulability, learning becomes an outcomes-driven activity
grounded in pre-determined goals, objectives, aims, and abstracted standards of socalled achievement. This, I claim, has devastating effects on the way we view and interact
with humans. In a phenomenological manner, we might say that contemporary
education has silenced, covered-over, and occluded the more primordial and ontological
aspects of our Being. Herein, I offer educators a vista into what phenomenology might
be able to show us in order to inspire us to rethink and reassess the modes of learning
that we tend to privilege (especially in the United States) in various standardized
versions of education that we have inherited from the tradition of scientific management

as it moves through behavioral psychology and cognitive psychology and now lives as
the learning sciences (Michael Schiro, 2009; John Bransford, 2000; Herbert Kliebard,
2004; Peter Taubman, 2009). Many years ago, Vandenberg (1971) formulated the
problem we still confront as educators in the era of standardization and NCLB. He
explains that "schooling in the post-Sputnik decade" emerged as a manifestation of "the
forgetfulness of being," and still today education is largely a manifestation of "the blind,
technological mentality that calculates what it wants and then manipulates objects and
people…in order to obtain what it wants" (131).
1. The Impoverished Ontology of Contemporary "Standardized" Curriculum
<4> Taubman (2009) identifies two problems emerging from contemporary
standardized education, which he traces to the effects of contemporary learning theory,
or the science of learning: (i) the erroneous conception of school-as-environment, where
education is thought to unfold according to the predictable logic of the continuum of
organism-environment-stimuli-response, wherein learning occurs when there is an
observable and demonstrable change in the student's behavior, and (ii) the issue of
curriculum content in education: it is the case that in contemporary schools the actual
content, or subject-matter, of learning in the curriculum is reducible to strategies-oflearning, e.g., the rise in metacognition, which is expressed in terms of strategies through
which students learn about the operations of the mind along with ways to control those
operations in order that they might be "applied" to the various tasks of the curriculum.
Examining these issues I show how a phenomenological perspective might contribute to
re-thinking and reconceptualizing the way we interpret, understand, and discourse, not
only about education, curriculum, and the students in our classrooms, but also the way
in which we conceive ourselves and other human beings. As I examine social efficiency in
education I ask the reader to keep the following query in mind: How are we conceiving
the human being in contemporary standardized education, and does this view do
violence to who we are as phenomenological subjects? It is my view that since education
and curriculum continue to be swayed by the findings of the "science of learning," there
exists the false belief that when the correct method is employed, through either a
naturalist model or computational-computerized model (environmental or neuronal),
education has predictable outcomes.
<5> To begin with the first concern, the understanding of the learning environment in
education is taken from biology: in straightforward terms, environment is the context
within which stimuli and organisms interact. Inside the learning environment the
learning transpires, and learning here, as indicated above, means that educators are
choosing and introducing the most appropriate stimuli to elicit or induce the so-called
correct behavior or desired outcome. In contemporary education in the United States
the environment assumes a reality that lives at a remove from human meaning, because
it is external to the subject. The so-called classroom environment is representative of an
"object that exists as a knowable space outside the subjectivities of those who occupy it"
(Taubman, 2009, 173). Immediately, a phenomenological concern arises: There is a
marked difference, not only in quality, but more importantly, in type, between the
behaviorist view of the human subject and the human subject as it is conceived in
existential-phenomenology. Thus, it is possible to envision a limited and stultifying
view of the human being, which social efficiency in education is producing, set within the

metaphysics of dualism, conceived in terms of a biological entity. The contemporary
student is reduced to an organism within an environment, or "locus of external stimuli rewards and punishments - that [can] be studied, categorized, and controlled" (172). As
indicated, the organism exists within the environment, but is separate from it, and thus
the environment can be studied apart from the organism "as well as in terms of the
effects it [has] on the organism," and ultimately, "those effects [are] read in the
behaviors of the organism" (171). Since this understanding of environment and
organism already presupposes a dualist metaphysics with a very specific view of the
mind, the learning sciences attempt to "address the dualism of such a concept of
environment by positing a 'third space' that joins the two, the space of the mental
representation and the inscription of those representations at the neuronal level" (172173).
<6> This brings us to our second concern: The learning sciences define learning in
terms of "retention, retrieval, and the transmission and transfer of pre-determined skills,
disposition or knowledge" (183). One of the assumptions of the learning sciences about
learning, which is of concern for the phenomenology of education, is that the "content of
learning is learning itself," that is, as opposed to authentic curriculum subject-matter,
"learning strategies, thinking skills, critical thinking, decision making skills, and
adaptive expertise, all of which are often grouped under metacognitive strategies,
become the content" (185). Metacognitive skills are important to learning sciences
because they provide thought-templates that are transposable, for the skills and strategies
are portable from context to context. Metacognitive knowledge is really a problemsolving model for thinking, and includes "knowledge of general strategies that may be
used for different tasks, the conditions under which those strategies may be used, the
extent to which the strategies are effective" (Lorin Anderson & David Krathwohl, 2001,
43). Metacognitive strategies are useful, according to Anderson, in that they allow
students to "structure their cognition (e.g., set subgoals), monitor their cognition (e.g.,
ask themselves questions as they read a piece of text, check their answer to a math
problem), and regulate their cognition (e.g., re-read something they don't understand,
go back and 'repair' their calculating mistake in a math problem)" (56). As stated, for the
most part, metacognitive strategies are now emphasized above content knowledge when
preparing students for standardized tests, and this holds true from the elementary
grades to college entrance/admissions examinations. Here the human is reduced to an
information processing unit within which knowledge is stored, retrieved, transmitted,
and applied when needed to the problems it encounters, marshaled through the
application of metacognitive strategies for thinking (Bransford 2000). This view
presupposes that the human is primarily directed toward its world in terms of a
knowing and calculating mind, a tightly ordered neural-web of information/data. Socalled knowledge of the world, in the form of mental representations, occurs when the
external world is assimilated internally by the mind, and this knowledge is then expressed
in the form of propositional (apodictic) discourse.
<7> All educators are familiar with the scientific method as a problem-solving strategy,
which is grounded in a theoretical (representationalist) view of comportment. By means of
working through the various stages of this method our interaction with the world, or
the curriculum, achieves a sense of continuity. We might envision this method
unfolding in five stages: (i) we confront a problem that interrupts the flow of practice

and we are forced to think in a reflective manner about it; (ii) we identify the structures
unique to the problem, which leads to the Statement of the Problem; (iii) we form
hypothetical ideas as virtual rehearsals for action and form a hypothesis, a predictive
theoretical construction, which is grounded in the problematic; (iv) the hypothesis is
analyzed so that its possible, probable, and desired outcomes result from its
implementation; and (v) the hypothesis is "enacted and the character of the problem is
changed. If the plans for action have been wisely and realistically formulated, then the
consequences produced are the ones anticipated; the hypothesis is warranted - it has
paid off" (Richard Brosio, 130, 2000). When implementing this method, a person's
behavior is intelligent when the action is aligned with the possible anticipated
consequences. A good education lives in the "reflection that helps make inevitable
occurrences and/or changed conditions beneficial to s/he who must undergo them," for
it is "experience, intelligence, and education that are to be understood as comparative
mastery over problematic situations" (132).
<8> In relation to the initial problems Taubman (2009) brought to our attention, it is
possible to state that the scientific method, although touted as a an active, experientially
involved form of problem-based learning (PBL) is yet another theory of and strategy for
learning that works primarily by means of abstracting concepts that are applied to
various practical situations with the goal of affording the practitioner mastery over
his/her environment. When employing this method for solving problems, working
through the steps outlined above, it is noted that steps one (i) through four (iv) has the
practitioner abstracting from the "lived experience" of the situation in order to
conceptualize (hypothesize/theorize) proposed solutions, in terms of "thought
experiments," which are then, in step five (v) applied, or enacted, in practice in order to
change the circumstances of the environment and (potentially) overcome problems
impeding the learning process. This method for problem solving might be classified in
the new taxonomy for learning as procedural knowledge, because it is concerned with
knowledge of how to do something in practical terms, but what's crucial here is that
procedural knowledge "often takes the form of a series or sequence of steps to follow. It
includes knowledge of skills, algorithms, techniques, and methods collectively known as
procedures," and this includes subsets of subject-specific skills and knowledge of
subject-specific techniques and methods (Anderson & Krathwohl, 2001, 52). Although
beginning from the student's experience of the world, within the lived context of the
particular problems they encounter, each with their own unique and particular aspects,
the mind-world split is still built into the scientific method's account of action as a form
of procedural problem-solving whereby through thought experiments and the
subsequent application of ideas the conditions of the environment are altered.
<9> It is possible to understand the scientific method in terms of an account of
intentional action as we find in John Searle (1983, 1999) that Dreyfus (1999, 2001)
brings our attention to, which philosophizes intentionality in terms of our selfreferential ideas in a causal relationship with the world. Dreyfus focuses on the manner
in which conscious intentionality unfolds in and through the mental (and linguistic)
representations of our goal-driven action. Dreyfus informs us that such accounts of
intentionality require both logical and phenomenological conditions of satisfaction: The
logical condition is fulfilled when my expectations for what will occur are fulfilled. That
the logical conditions for satisfaction "must be represented in the mind, i.e., that they

must be structures of a conscious subject separate from, and standing over-against an
object"(3), represents the phenomenological requirement. There are also two conditions
in order for a bodily movement to qualify as an action: first, the mental representation of
a goal must extend throughout the action playing a "continual causal role in shaping the
action" (4); this is the "intention in action," and is different than the prior intention,
which is the goal as it is represented prior to the initiation of movement, and secondly,
the causal connection between the intention in action and the bodily movements must
be experienced by the subject. If we connect this analysis and conception of intentional
action with the unfolding of the scientific method, it is possible to understand the claim
from above, namely, that the scientific method is driven by a view of the human and the world
that retains the Cartesian split between mind (subject) and world (object), and, as with all
dualist thought, there is a tendency to privilege one of the terms in the polar hierarchy
between mind and matter, and the judgment here, is in favor of the mind. The scientific
method is a theoretical strategy for solving problems, which is mediated by mental
representations, rules, steps and stages, and intentional (eidetic) content that is
abstracted from the context of lived worldly involvement, and it is, for this reason, a
derivative mode of disclosure and comportment.
<10> Dreyfus' philosophy demonstrates that we inhabit the world in a multiplicity of
ways and that we cannot be reduced primarily to an entity that draws ideas from and
brings them to bear upon an external reality. This phenomenological understanding
might be related to the reconceptualization of our contemporary educational practices.
For example, in the new science of learning, Darling-Hammond & Brandford, (2005)
and Bransford (2000) equate learning with understanding, which is defined in terms of
"usable knowledge," i.e., "expertise which is connected and organized around
independent concepts" (9). We are experts when our "knowledge is connected and
organized around important concepts (e.g., Newton's second law of motion); it is
'conditionalized' to specify the contexts in which it is applicable; it supports
understanding and transfer (to other contexts) rather than only the ability to
remember" (9). Anderson & Krathwohl (2001) argue that conceptual knowledge, which
includes concepts, principles, models, and theories, is required for expertise in the
academic disciplines. Conceptual knowledge and the generalizations that accrue "have the
greatest value in describing, predicting, explaining or determining the most appropriate
and relevant action or direction to be taken" (57). This form of knowledge is privileged
in both the standardized curriculum and educational research grounded in social
efficiency, which manifests as concept empiricism. Concept empiricism justifies the split
between research and practice and is "concerned with developing hypothesis to be tested,
and testing them in methodological ways characteristic of mainstream social science"
(Pinar, 1998, 171). Its research findings seek to generalize and establish principles and
overarching categories, e.g., the ideal student, the effective teacher, academic
achievement, along with attempting to establish general theories of curriculum and
learning. As related to phenomenology, it is possible to state that education in the
United States represents one of many objectifying practices in the contemporary world,
and this notion emerges from Dreyfus' extensive work on Heidegger's phenomenology
and his views on ontology and world-founding epochal forces, or modes of worldlyattunement (1962; 1971). I return to the question posed earlier, keeping in mind the
view of the human being that social efficiency engenders: Does this view do violence to
who we are as phenomenological subjects? I move in the next section to consider the impact

that philosophy has, not only on education, but as well on the contemporary milieu,
which in great part influences the way in which the world and others come-to-presence for
us, in ways that shape our Being-in-the-world.
2. A Phenomenological Reconceptualization of World and Human
<11> The view of contemporary curriculum I have introduced might be traced to the
"new science orthodoxy" in education (Kenneth Howe, 2009) and the privileging of
analytic-empirical-technical ways of knowing the world, and, as stated, this links
education with what Dreyfus (1981) identifies as an objectifying practice. Dreyfus (1981)
links this view with technology and the positivistic empirical/social sciences, which
explain things in terms of thematizing the world within an objective and removed form
of knowledge that alone provides us with the "systematic order of all reality," and this is
the nihilistic view already implicit to the ancient Greek belief that "the theoretical,
detached attitude was our fundamental access to reality" (510). Dreyfus, following
Heidegger's interpretation of Plato, writes the following about objectification:
"Objectification starts when Plato posits ideas as ideal objects over and against a
knower who, while not yet understood as subject, is already understood as something
other than the ideas that he contemplates" (510). Along with Dreyfus, educators should
be highly critical of practices wherein "theory" and calculative thought ( modes of
objectification) are privileged above other forms of world-disclosure and modes of
thinking. He highlights five features of theory that work as an ensemble to contribute to
the devaluation of the role of the body, senses, emotions, and affective ways of knowing
our factical lived world of experience: (i) The drive to objectify the world in thought,
wherein the subject is separated from the ideas he contemplates; (ii) The drive to make
all things explicit through propositional explanation; (iii) The resulting decontextualization of all things contemplated; (iv) The re-contextualizing of the things
contemplated into an abstracted system of objective ideas; and (v) The formation of a
"world picture" that is linked with a specific historical "mind-set," and in the end, "the
subject stands outside of and over against whatever it is he knows, and sees it as
objective, explicit, context-free, a total picture" (511).
<12> Here there is a move to ignore and cover over the manner in which the human is
immersed in the world as Being-in-the-world. According to Dreyfus, this leads to the
false and pernicious view that the mind is not only superior to the physical world, it also
suggests that people primarily live and comport themselves through the use of their
minds, and once a context-free world picture is formed at a remove from factical
experience, our worldly, embodied, experiential practices lose "meaning and authority"
(512). In this view, and this is precisely what we witness occurring in standardized
education, the human being is reduced to an epistemological subject, and the most
primordial ontological aspects of its Being are lost or occluded. Indeed, the new
taxonomy (Anderson & Krathwohl, 2001) restricts the knowledge forms in the
curriculum and their ancillary modes to the following four main types: conceptual
knowledge, procedural knowledge, factual knowledge, and metacognitive knowledge. If
education is to be an experience of enlightenment and the harbinger of human
transcendence, we must seriously question the limited concern for, and in the extreme,
the exclusion of, various affective forms of knowledge such as intuitive, normative, and
aesthetic, which, as Nussbaum (1990) shows is a legitimate form of emotional intellection.

This is often dismissed as an inauthentic mode of knowing or excluded outright from
the curriculum.
<13> What type of alternative, ontological view of the human within its world might
phenomenology provide, which avoids reducing the subject to an epistemic subject? To
begin, for phenomenology, the subject is not merely reactive to external stimuli, which
would reduce the human to a " tabula rasa upon which the world makes its mark, a
template for social conditioning" (Madeline Grumet, 1992, 23). Rather than
environment, phenomenology wants us to rethink the context for and the Situation of
learning in terms of a discourse between individual and world, one in which the subject,
rather than being set at an objective remove from the world, is immersed in the world
and equipped to freely construct meaning, i.e., "interpret, repudiate, or reaffirm
experience" (23). The problem with viewing the curriculum in terms of a biological
"environment" is that it reduces education to a "series of reactive, conditioned behaviors
best described as training" (23). Although behaviorists accept this view, it is rejected by
phenomenology with its avowed commitment to human freedom. Aoki's (2005)
phenomenology of education insists that we open ourselves up to the possibilities of
thinking and discoursing in terms of embracing a multiplicity of ways in which to
experience, know, and understand the world, which he calls, embracing the either/or,
neither/nor, and both/and frameworks for world-disclosure - it is a perspectival way of
Being-in-the-world, which outstrips the limitations imposed by Cartesian metaphysics.
This, for Jardine (1992), amounts to education concerning itself with the "risks of selftranscendence involved in the exploration of many possibilities of understanding, selfunderstanding, and mutual understanding" (121).
<14> We must note that with this talk, phenomenology is not advocating for the
exclusion of theoretical modes of disclosing the world, but rather, as Dreyfus (1999)
states, phenomenology seeks to "make a place for a sort of activity that has been
overlooked by both commonsense and a fortiori by the philosophical tradition" (9). The
activity we are concerned with relates to ontology and is irreducible to epistemology, in
that we live the world prior to knowing the world in a systematic manner. Epistemology is
primarily concerned with ways in which we know the world, in terms of what it is and
that it is; ontology is primarily concerned with how we are in the world, i.e., how it is
that our Being is stretched out between birth and death in terms of phenomenological selfhood (Michael Bonnett, 2009). Grumet (1992) reminds us, that if definition of education
requires an understanding of epistemology, "any consideration of epistemology requires
an ontological foundation" (30). Curriculum theorists Grumet, Jardine, and Aoki have
provided a vista into certain aspects of the human being conceived in terms other than
the Cartesian one, intimating a richer ontological sense of human life than is afforded by
Descartes' metaphysics. I now turn to Dreyfus' (1999, 2001) unique phenomenologicalphilosophical account of the ontological foundations of human existence, which
represents the most aboriginal form of learning that we experience. Dreyfus (1999;
2000) does not provide an analysis of formal education, although he certainly deals with
learning in his work on skill acquisition in Maurice Merleau-Ponty's nonrepresentationalist cognitive science. It is possible to elucidate a concept of original
learning by examining Dreyfus' phenomenology. It is rare to see Dreyfus'
phenomenology in any account of education and I believe that his unique interpretation
of Heidegger's (1962) fundamental ontology provides us with a rich interpretation of the

most primordial level of Dasein's lived experience of learning in the world. This
“enactive” view of intentionality embraces the notion that our engagement with the
world “through actions and projects” is not reducible to “simple mental states,” but
involves an “intentionality that is motoric and bodily” (Gallagher, 2012, 76).
<15> In addition to practical comportment and theoretical comportment there is a third layer
of lived experience, which, as indicated by Joseph Rouse (2001), not only underlies the
mode of theorizing (conceptual knowledge) it is also anterior to the mode of practical
comportment (procedural knowledge), and this is what Dreyfus (1993, 1999, 2001) refers
to as absorbed coping. Dreyfus (1999) calls this mode of comportment "a third kind of
being - a kind of being that is neither natural nor constituted, but is produced by
embodied intentionality that is always already present in the world of involved, active,
social beings" (23). The formalized understanding, or the thematized view, of learning
that contemporary standardized education embraces stands in sharp contrast to this
mode of moving through the world wherein we are already learning in a primordial
manner in that we are transformed as we at once transform our world. This mode of
existence, a way of being absorbed in the world of our activities, which embodies our
response to the address of the world (Sean Kelly, 2005), is ignored by the learning
sciences, and yet, as indicated, all learning, whether it is practical or
contemplative/theoretical is derived from and dependent on this aboriginal way of
Being-in-the-world. Let us elaborate Dreyfus' (1999) account of "coping" by looking at
its structure, which is grounded in activity that is intentional but devoid of ideational
content. First, it neither has initial intentionality in terms of a definitive goal (telos) nor is
there intentionality in action, i.e., the holding of a mental image that is stretched out
through the duration of the action. It is a unique form of comportment typical of
everyday activity, a basic way of Being-in-the-world that does not involve intentionality as
linked with mental representations. Secondly, this non-ideational intentionality "is the
condition of the possibility of both kinds of intentionality" (2). To return to a point
introduced earlier, phenomenology does not want to "make practical activity primary,"
rather it seeks to "show that neither practical activity nor contemplative knowing can be
understood as a relation between a self-sufficient subject with its intentional content
and an independent object" (2).
<16> In absorbed coping there is a responsiveness to circumstances within situations
wherein we are attempting to maneuver our way through the world with others. One's
activity is "experienced as a steady flow of skillful activity" in response to one's sense of
the situation, which solicits that person to "get into the right relationship to it"
(Dreyfus, 1999, 6). Our purposes can only be made explicit when we step back in
reflection from the activity, or, as in Heidegger's (1962) account of tool-Being, the
equipment with which we are working breaks down or fails to function. Dreyfus (1999)
provides many examples of absorbed coping, such as "working, getting around, talking,
eating, driving, and etc," even though these are undeniably meaningful and purposeful
activities, "skillful coping does not require mental representation of its goal at all. It can
be purposive without the agent entertaining a purpose" (7). For example, I often ride my
bicycle around the neighborhood, and when doing so, I am oblivious to the engaged
activity of biking because I am taking in my surroundings, the gestalt of the terrain, and
responding, not, however, through the application of the knowledge of "how" to ride a
bike, not "through the intentional content of the experience of action," which is a

"representation of my brining about the state of affairs I am trying to achieve" (7).
Rather, in this particular example of absorbed coping, I am simply, as if on auto-pilot,
peddling faster to accelerate, breaking when I want to slow myself down and taking
curves with no thought to what I am doing. Although I have no mental representation
of the activity of biking as a "bodily action," I am able to perform the activity in a highly
proficient manner, all this so as "to complete the gestalt made up" of the situation of
biking (6). However, if my brakes fail or the bike chain loosens, I would certainly
become aware of my activity and how that activity is related to other activities (a
referential totality comprising my world) that might be linked with the importance of
exercise and fitness for my life. I will have more to say about the phenomenon of
breakdown-and-revelation below.
<17> This mode of original world-disclosure, as Dreyfus claims, drawing interpretation
from Heidegger's notion of ontological transcendence, "is attributed not to consciousness,
but to Dasein," in that it is neither reducible to a mind nor a discrete physical body that
is involved in the process of disclosive activity at this primordial level (11). Rather it is
the characterization of the Being of the human, which, "involves absorbed
responsiveness" to situations within which it finds itself (11). Following from this line of
thought, this form of comportment that is non-ideational, is not merely a maneuvering
amid and around objects within Cartesian space, rather, as Rouse (2001) points out, nonideational comportment "discloses things themselves freed from intentional
intermediaries," and those things that are revealed are not "discrete objects but an
interconnected setting organized around one's…concerns" (2). In the midst of absorbed
coping we are not demonstrating "a self contained sequence of movements, but a
flexible responsiveness to a situation as it unfolds" (2). This system is not a
"determinate arrangement of objects but the setting of some possible comportments"
(2). As Dreyfus (1999) states, "The basic idea is that for a particular person to be
directed toward a particular piece of equipment, whenever using it, perceiving it, or
whatever, there must be a correlation between that person's general skillful coping and
the interconnected equipment whole in which the thing has a place" (11). And this place
within which our activities make sense and have meaning we call world, the system of
Dasein's meanings and relations, and this context (Dasein's web of meanings) represents
a "field of possible activity with something at stake," which holds the potential to elicit
an "intelligible response to it by a being to whom the situation and its outcome matter"
(Rouse, 2001, 4). Thus, at the most basic level of lived experience, absorbed coping is
about meaning and meaningful activity, which finds structure in the fore-the-sake-ofwhich we do things, and "its constituents are 'in-order-to' realize some possible way of
being" (4). To reinforce this notion, Heidegger (1985) describes walking across a room
as a field experience: "My encounter with the room is not such that I first take in one
thing after another and put together a manifold of things in order to then see a room.
Rather, I primarily see a referential whole" (187). Dreyfus (2001), contributing to this
understanding of being in the world as a system of relations, observes that when I am in a
room, "I take the room in its wholeness, and my 'set' or 'readiness' to cope with chairs
by avoiding them or by sitting on them, for example, is 'activated' when I enter a room.
My readiness is, of course, not a set of beliefs or rules for dealing with rooms and chairs;
it is a sense of how rooms normally show up, a skill for dealing with them, that I have
developed," or, we might say, learned tacitly, "by crawling and walking around many
rooms" (103).

<18> As might be inferred from this account, more important than knowledge of our
situation or surroundings, is the meaning-significance for our life that emerges from out
of the situations within which we find ourselves, and hence world for Heidegger (1962),
and the successful navigation thereof, is never primarily an issue for epistemology,
rather, it is undoubtedly an ontological issue first and foremost, and as stated, it is
related to the way things and others in our world have meaning for our lives. Our
understanding, which manifests as projection, is always dependent upon the wherein that
is the context of the world, and this is always an understanding that is antecedent to
both practical and theoretical comportment, for as Heidegger (1962) states, " The 'wherein'
of an act of understanding which assigns or refers itself, is that for which one lets entities be
encountered in the kind of Being that belongs to involvements; and this 'wherein' is the
phenomenon of the world " (119/86, emphasis in original). The world is a context for the
primordial totality of relationships that alone give meaning-significance to Dasein's life,
and both emerge by means of the relational, or referential totality, of involvement, which
is a process of signifying (bedeuten) through this relational totality the sense of
significance (Bedeutsamkeit) this has for Dasein's Being (120/87). We are not made aware
of the ontological structure of our involvement with equipment and others within the
world by means of theories or calculated methods of discernment, but rather the world
as system of relations and meanings manifests within moments when the flow of praxis
is disrupted in the phenomenon breakdown-and-revelation. The disturbance, or problem
encountered, makes us aware of the function of equipment and the way it fits into the
meaningful context of our practical activities, which, as Heidegger indicates, is
inextricably bound up with the revelation of the larger phenomenon, namely, that of
world: "When an assignment to some particular towards-this has been thus
circumspectively aroused. We catch sight of the 'towards-which' [for-the-sake-ofwhich] itself, and along with it everything connected to the work - the whole
'workshop' - as that wherein concern dwells. The context of equipment is lit up, not as
something never seen before, but as a totality constantly sighted beforehand in
circumspection. With this totality, however, the world announces itself" (105/74-75).
<19> As Kelley (2005) points out, "Dreyfus's approach to phenomenology has always
focused on the first-person phenomenon of everyday absorbed activity - activity in
which we find ourselves engaged even though we are not noticing that we are engaged
in it" (15). There is, importantly, as stated above, at this level of absorbed involvement,
a process of learning always taking place, I am learning in the most original manner by
responding in a multiplicity of ways to the address of the world, e.g., when I reach out
to grasp a doorknob it "affords or solicits grasping…without even noticing it is
happening, my hand forms itself naturally to the shape of the doorknob" (17), whatever
that shape might be. Although I do not "explicitly notice the doorknob (ex hypothesi), it
nevertheless directs or leads my grasp," and what distinguishes this level of lived
experience from linguistic representations or ideational representations, or any
"detached perceptual experience of the world, is that the content of my engaged activity
is not a description of the world, even one that uses bare demonstratives; rather it is a
response to the world's demands" (18). There are no strategies or well-laid plans for
approaching doorknobs or crossing rooms. In fact, the absorbed involvement within a
chess match in which a master player is involved is, for Dreyfus (1999), an example of
"complex problem solving," which only appears to "implement a long-range strategy"
(19). However, as opposed to the formulation of a strategy on the master's part, his

moves "may be best understood as direct [unmediated] responses to familiar perceptual
gestalts" (9). To learn is to respond in ever-new ways to the address and demands of the
perceptual gestalt, the world within which our referential totality is embedded, and as it
changes, so too does our relationship to the world, and this is finite human transcendence
as conceived by both Heidegger and Dreyfus. To formalize such activity, to break it
down in analysis, to step back from the activity in contemplative thought, to return to
the example of the doorknob and my grip, the very act of "noticing my hand," reflecting
on the activity, contemplating the movement, "breaks the spell that the world had over
it" (Kelly, 2005, 19). Kelly goes on to add, and here we might relate this to educational
research, all "right-thinking people" should recognize that "sensitivity to the firstperson perspective [of phenomenology] is essential to any full and proper account" of
the world and human being (22). This recognition of absorbed coping as a primordial
mode of Being-in-the-world figures into Vandenberg's (1971, 1974) phenomenology of
educational theory, and he describes it as being grounded in our pretheoretical ways of
Being, which contribute to our fore-conception and fore-having of the original
experience of the fundamental ontological grounds of learning, as manifest in the preunderstanding.
3. The Fundamental Educational Theory Grounded in Ontology
<20> How might this phenomenological talk of the most primordial way in which we
are in the world relate to our notion of formal education or the formalization of the
curriculum? Is it possible that its analysis might have something to contribute to our
reconceptualization of curriculum? The rejoinder to these difficult queries will comprise
the final section of the paper. The reader will note that much of my scholarly work
focuses on philosophers of education and curriculum theorists from the first wave of the
phenomenological movement in educational research (Magrini, 2014), but here I restrict
my focus to Vandenberg (1971; 1974), who I consider a major force in educational
phenomenological research during the late 1960s and 1970s in the United States. His
work continues to provide valuable, if as yet untapped, insights into the power of
phenomenology to enhance our educational practices. I begin by elucidating what
Vandenberg refers to as fundamental educational theory. In Vandenberg, the idea of
foundational functions duplicitously: first, it refers to a foundation or grounding, and
secondly, it refers to the fundamental ontology involved in grounding the
phenomenological view of education in the first instance - Vandenberg was one of the
first scholars working in Post-Husserlian phenomenology who performed exegetical
work on Heidegger's (1962) Being in Time in its potential relation to education and
educational philosophy. Although it is the case that Vandenberg does not offer us
anything resembling the depth of interpretation that Dreyfus has provided of
Heidegger's philosophy, Vandenberg, in a critical and unique manner, is contemplating
the potential of phenomenology's exploration of the non-thematic mode of worldly
comportment for the potential betterment of our educational practices. As stated, his
fundamental educational theory is grounded in non-thematic (non-ideational)
comportment, which informs our pre-understanding of things, and allows us to step into
the circle of hermeneutic interpretation, with the focus on discerning for analysis the
original ways in which we are in the world and at once always and already learning, or
Being-educated, anterior to any notion of a formalized, and hence thematized education
(schooling).

<21> Vandenberg states that educational theory cannot be justified by parent or sister
disciplines such as sociology, empirical science, and cognitive psychology. This indicates
that educational theory is "autonomous from other disciplines, though dependent on
them" (185). Although educational theory is composed of a body of principles that are
justified by reasons "related to the findings of the factual, theoretical, and normative
disciplines, they are logically independent of these sciences" (185). Educational theory
does not possess intrinsic worth or meaning, as if existing "in a Platonic realm of ideas
independently of someone's having them in mind" (185). We seek to find "educational
phenomena (or facts) about which one will subsequently formulate a theory with
concepts that in fact do have the requisite logic - and ontological - characteristics" (187).
Typically, educational theory consists of three levels: (i) there is the level of practice; (ii)
there is the level at which educational principles are "formulated within the horizons of
the practical situations in general" (187) that are justified by the special sciences; and
(iii) there is the level that consists of the search for sociological, psychological, and
philosophical elements underlying practice; "this occurs within the horizons of the
general features of the educational situation from the vantage point of the parent
discipline" (187). This indicates that practice is viewed and assessed through the
conceptual lens of sociology, psychology, or philosophy. According to Vandenberg, this
provides a disingenuous model for authentic educational practice. When theorists "lose
sight of the educational system altogether and explore issues in the parent discipline in
their own right" (188), they give rise to an educational theory that is not autonomous,
for it is too closely allied with the concepts, logic, and epistemological paradigm of the
parent discipline. In this instance we have a theory of education, which seeks to
influence and direct practice, but has lost sight of the actual lived experience of
education as it is abstracted and generalized at level (ii). Educational theory, according
to Vandenberg, should in fact be authentically drawing its inspiration from level (i), and
through the ever-renewed process of hermeneutic interpretation authentic educational
theory returns to the level of the lived experience of educating with an ever-deepening
understanding of the human being and the processes of Being-educated. What
Vandenberg brings to light represents the tendency in education to embrace a theory of
learning and curriculum that is "out of touch" with the lived experience of "learning"
(254).
<22> As a corrective, and this comes by way of an understanding of ontology and
phenomenological-hermeneutics, it is possible to envision the reconceptualization of the
levels of tradition education as suggested by Vandenberg, which "requires the
juxtaposition of humanistically formulated educational theory and educational practice
to retain this pedagogic perspective and to maintain visibility of educational
phenomenon as such" (189). When Vandenberg talks of educational phenomena qua
educational phenomena - the essence, is-ness, or Being of education - he is opening the
door to a phenomenological and ontological view of education, which is expressed in
and through a fundamental educational theory: (i) the practitioner begins at the level of
lived educational practice, which is still at this level understood in terms of a formalized
education; (ii) through the phenomenological method Sense (Sinn)-giving-meaning
structures are rested from concealment for thematic analysis, i.e., phenomenology
performs a fundamental ontology of the lived experience of practitioners and students, and
thus teases out those aspects of education that are hidden, or remain pre-theoretical, but
are always at work influencing our pre-understanding of education in the mode of

everyday existence (as in the tacit understanding of Being in Heidegger, here, in
Vandenberg, we encounter the tacit understanding of the Being of education or learning);
(iii) educational principles are formulated in relation to level (ii) and the justification
contributed by the "special sciences" is attuned to the ontological analysis of the
structures of Being-educated. At level (iii) there is already a fourth level presupposed, and
this is where the phenomenological method "turns back" to levels (i) and (ii) in order to
deepen the interpretation of the ontological understanding of Being-educated. This is
precisely the manner in which Heidegger (1962) views the spiral unfolding of the
phenomenological method and hermeneutic interpretation, which never arrives at a
definitive conclusion to its inquiries. For, as Heidegger reminds us, when performing a
fundamental ontology, "in this field, where 'the thing itself is deeply veiled' one must take
pains not to overstate the results. For in such an inquiry one is constantly compelled to
face the possibility of discovering an even more primordial and more universal horizon
from which we may draw the answer to the question, 'What is 'Being'" (49/29)? What is
crucial in Vandenberg's philosophy is the attention to pre-theoretical ways of learning.
"Teachers, for example," claims Vandenberg, "occasionally possess great pedagogic
wisdom before pedagogy became an object of university research. This is a non-thematic
understanding that is acquired through the buffetings of experience in the classroom.
When a practitioner's pretheoretical understanding is rigorously explicated by an
immanent reflection, i.e., by an interpretive hermeneutic, it becomes fundamental
educational theory" (190, my emphasis).
<23> As stated, in traditional forms of educational theory, which allow parent and
sister disciplines to shape the view of education, the theorists are predominantly
restricted to the investigation of education from within the conceptual lens of the
discipline, which is ordered by an epistemological paradigm or structure unique to that
discipline, and when several conceptual lenses converge to offer a view of education, the
phenomenon of education, which of course includes of view of the student, is splintered
and fragmented. According to Vandenberg, this does violence not only to the
phenomenon of education, but also to the student, for it is wrong for educators to "chop
up the living child into modes of abstraction created by the various disciplines," rather,
authentic educational theory should, in the first instance, confront "the 'whole child'" in
authentic situations of learning, or Being-educated, for this reveals "the educational facts
that an educational theory is designed to explicate and explain" (189). When educational
theory is reduced to its dependence on one or another of the sciences, for example, from
either the perspective of political science or economics, "the direct application of
concepts from these disciplines to educational practice has the effect" of transforming
the human being into a political animal or an economic animal (214). This practice needs
to be evaluated in terms of the form of human existence it produces and promotes, and,
according to Vandenberg, a view of the human being in which, for example, the political
"dominates every other dimension," would obviously represent a severely limited view
of human life, and in the extreme, it would produce "an obviously unhuman life" (214).
The use of the concepts of the separate sciences to understand the phenomenon of
education "in no way depends upon the validity of the concepts in their own domain, but
must be evaluated in terms of the program conveyed, that is, in terms of the effect upon
the child's life in determining who he will become" (214), i.e., grounded in the
ontological way that the child is already in the world "of learning" as a human being
prior to an institutionalized school setting. No matter how rigorous or solid the science

- education is ultimately about the normative effect it exacts on the child's life. There is
indeed the hope that phenomenology as it is related to fundamental educational theory
might contribute to the restoration "of the wholeness of educational phenomena as they
appear within the educating perspective" (189).
<24> In fundamental educational theory, principles, understood as emerging at the third
level do so through the practice of the dialogic principle, which furnishes "the context of
relevance" for foundational theory that is essential - unlike product-process models for
curriculum making, the principles for education associated with fundamental educational
theory are already immanent in the lived experience of learning at the primordial level of
Being's unfolding. The dialogic principle, which is phenomenology's intuitive scanning of
the first-person lived experience of pre-theoretic practices of original learning, allows
what is tacitly presupposed about learning, once wrested from concealment, to inform
the educational principles. "Established on the ontological level," these ontologicoexistential Sense ( Sinn)-giving-making structures, "necessarily underlie every principle
that can be established," because they are instantiated in our "lived" experience "at the
ontic level" (Vandenberg, 1974, 214). Vandenberg considers and discusses a primordial
level of existence that is reminiscent of absorbed coping, and at this level of existence
we are tacitly accumulating, acquiring, and passing along information, which is later
made explicit in other modes of practical and cognitive involvement. As Vandenberg
points out, there is a "slow assimilation of many things that are not thematically
reflected upon that slowly develops one's pre-theoretical understanding" (195) and that
"pre-judgments are accumulated non-thematically in experience is a phenomenological
finding" (197). This might be linked with Dreyfus' (1999) position stressing the primacy
of phenomenology over logical analysis when seeking to understand the third mode of
being, "absorbed coping," which is "too specific and contextualized to be analyzed using
the usual philosophical understanding of propositional representations" (21). In
everyday modes of coping, as elucidated by Dreyfus (1999; 2001), we already have a tacit
understanding of what it means to learn, but this understanding or insight is not
explicitly represented via mental imagery, and this mode of tacitly understanding
learning, for Vandenberg, must be brought to light and analyzed through the
phenomenological description and hermeneutic interpretation. As Vandenberg (1974)
reasons, if fundamental educational theory focuses on the phenomenological description of
the "tacit knowing of the practitioner, it introduces no philosophical, theological, or
ideological doctrine of its own, but it does tap an extremely rich resource of [potential]
knowledge that is hardly been explored previously" (190).
<25> Let us briefly examine how the dialogic principle functions in Vandenberg's
phenomenology. The dialogic principle reveals for thematic analysis the ontologicoexistential structures giving order and "structuring meaning" within our everyday
modes of educating. This relates to Heidegger's (1962) view of the task and focus of
phenomenology, which means "legein ta phainomena, where legein means apophainesthai,"
and so phenomenology literally means "apophainesthai ta phainomena - to let that which
shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself"
(58/34). However, this is certainly not to indicate that phenomenology simply sees
things as they are, as they come to presence before us, for this would never rise to a
"science of phenomena." Rather, phenomenology is a form of seeing that sees behind or
beyond what is directly before us, and this represents for Heidegger, as it does for

Vandenberg, the phenomenological move to wrest from concealment the ontologicoexistential structures that give sense-meaning to our lived experience. According to
Heidegger (1962), phenomenology is "distinguished from the ordinary conception" of
phenomena because it is concerned with that which "does not show itself at all; it is
something that lies hidden, in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part
does show itself," and here Heidegger explicitly references the ontological foundations
of appearances, which at once belong to what "shows itself," and these "foundations
belong to appearances in an essential way as to constitute the meaning and ground of the
appearances" (59/35, my emphasis).
<26> With this explanation in mind, the dialogic principle begins at the level of
observing and reflecting on situations where we believe education or learning is
transpiring. For example, when in the classroom with students we might notice several
of them having difficulty with a question or problem. These students manifest in a mode
of self-showing as "help-requiring" (198). The dialogic principle, inspired by the
phenomenological practice of “imaginative variation,” asks the following question: Can
we imagine instances of education wherein both children and adult learners (students)
do not show up at times as "helpless"? Might not "helplessness," as related to human
finitude, represent one of the essential characteristics (Sinn Sense-giving-making
structures) of all instances of education or learning? Can we conceive instances of
education or learning wherein people do not require help or assistance? If we attempt to
perceive and imagine education without the essential ontologico-existential mode of
Being-helpless, the phenomenon of education, as it came to presence within our initial
observations, disappears; education is no longer present in its original self-showing from
out of itself. We might also ask: Are there any instances of learning or education that we
can imagine taking place in isolation, at a remove from social or historical situations?
Since we cannot, the social and historical become essential ontological structures of
learning and education. Now, in order to consider phenomenology's task of wresting
from concealment the ontologico-existential aim of education, which for Vandenberg,
represents the ontological essence of education as it informs his fundamental educational
theory, we ask: Are there any instances which rightly deserve the name "education"
wherein the acquisition of meaning (or the deepening of the understanding) is not an
essential aim of the process of learning in terms of human transcendence? Since we cannot,
we conclude that the "aim" of education represents the ontologico-existential meaning
structure that defines education qua education (education as such) in its very Being:
"Fundamental educational theory indicates how man [sic] can become a human being
through educating by articulating the basic phenomena of education in the structural
context demarcated by aim of educating" (211).
<27> The aim of education, or original learning, as related to Dreyfus' (1999; 2001)
interpretation of finite human transcendence, is a process and way of being wherein we
are always projected out beyond what/who we are at any given moment and this
phenomenon is intimately related to "non-formal" learning, because we are always
already in the world in such a way that in and through understanding we are on the
approach back to ourselves as other from out of the indeterminate future; education is an
original process of becoming-other-in-learning, and this prior to unpacking any texts,
prior to preparing for any tests, prior to passing through the doors of any educational
institution. Human transcendence, as the embodiment and manifestation of original

learning, is grounded in the "third mode of Being," non-ideational intentionality, which is
not merely a characteristic or trait added on to human existence, neither is it reducible
to a function of consciousness, rather this directedness toward the world from within
the world in search of meaning comprises the primordial world-of-learning, and it is
intimately bound up with and inseparable from our Being. This is precisely what
Vandenberg explores within his fundamental educational theory, which, as he informs us,
"investigates man [sic] in his fundamental essential characteristic of requiring
education to become man because everything that man is able to do or be directly
human is due to his having been educated" (213).
<28> However, as we have seen, this goal of acquiring meaning is a far cry from the
determinate goals and terminal aims of traditional curriculum as we find in social
efficiency, rather the aim of education, according to Vandenberg, is always already
occurring at a pre-theoretical level because "the human is always projecting into some
possibilities in the world and future, and this project is understood, and the
understanding of the project of being is permeated with personal concern" (213), i.e.,
concern for our Being and the Being of others, concern for our unique possibilities for
Being, concern for the way in which things show up for our appropriation as havingmeaning for our Being. In this original view of education informing fndamental educational
theory we are no longer focused primarily on epistemological concerns, because
conceptual knowledge, procedural knowledge, metacognitive knowledge, and factual
knowledge are in fact all derived from and dependent on pre-theoretical modes of
understanding the world as described in absorbed coping. Fundamental educational theory
opens the way for the essential "accessibility of 'man' in his educability," and this is
never restricted to institutionalized settings or formal definitions of education that have
been forged and reified within the standardized logic of social efficiency ideology. It is
only, according to Vandenberg, when we approach education through a "hermeneutic
phenomenology," that the possibility exists to yield "educational phenomena that
furnish the distinct object of research that is studied by no other discipline, thereby,"
and perhaps for the first time, "creating the possibility of a discipline of education"
(213).
In the End: The Grounding of Ground
<29> Adopting a critical view of Vandenberg's position we might say that it falls victim
to its own critique of traditional educational theory - for in place of the disciplines such
as philosophy and science, we now view the educational experience through the
restricted conceptual lens of "phenomenology" with its unique paradigm for knowing.
Why should we accept the claim that phenomenology offers us the potential for a more
authentic form of educational theory than the tradition? Is this view not also limited in
the scope of its vision? These are legitimate concerns, however I believe the following
rejoinder might be marshaled in defense of Vandenberg's turn to phenomenology (and
ipso facto ontology) in the attempt to rescue educational theory: Since we are dealing
with ontology, we are dealing with the most fundamental (essential) ways of our
existence as human beings. Since ontological issues are always prior to epistemological
concerns with knowledge and psychological categories for structuring conscious
existence, it is possible to state, invoking later Wittgenstein (1991), that when we reach
ground, or bedrock, there can be no more talk of justification or validation, but rather,

at this point, we are simply standing in the presence of the is-ness of existence (Aoki,
2005). Phenomenology indeed brings us into close proximity to the very grounds (isness) of our existence by returning us to the primordial aspects of life that have been
covered over and occluded by the technological-scientific worldview.
<30> Importantly, Vandenberg's (1971) fundamental educational theory resists the
tendency in analytic-empirical modes of education to reify the student, which is the
"analytic reduction of the phenomenon to something else" (140), i.e., the human student
becomes something other than human - a number, place-holder, percentile, or statistic.
Fundamental educational theory embraces "nonreductive and nonobjectifying" ways of
viewing and encountering the student that are necessary for authentic education to
obtain (140). Fundamental educational theory allows for, and further, facilitates the
coexistence between teachers and students, which represents the "projecting into
possibilities in the world" in relation to the "co-disclosure of possibilities of being"
(140). Such a concept and enactment of education, however, according to Vandenberg, is
impossible within the "established societal power structures" dictating the "relations
between people," which are reduced to "dominance/submission patters, to
commanding/obeying relations" (131). Those words were penned over forty years ago,
and now we must ask as educators, how far have we progressed in the quest to
overcome the disingenuous binary power structures of which Vandenberg speaks? In
response to this query I claim that we have not yet outstripped social efficiency, which, as
argued throughout, is a limiting and stultifying view of education that has lost sight of
and is moving farther away from the human subject as conceived by Heidegger,
Dreyfus, and Vandenberg, namely, in terms of Being-in-the-world. In this paper I have
attempted to contribute to the further development of Vandenberg's early thought by
demonstrating its continued relevance and immediacy in a time of high stakes testing,
standardization, and hyper-accountability, where educators still cling to the false and
empty promises of reform proffered by analytic-empirical (quantitative) research, which
is grounded in the instrumentalist-representationalist view of education. Educational
reform on a grand scale is an unrealistic hope, for "envisioning the mass liberation of
education in this manner ignores the complexity and depth of what is involved to
accomplish this task" (Magrini, 2012, 513). However, perhaps it is possible to open
worlds in the current curriculum that stand beyond the technical-empirical attunement
of social efficiency and its drive for standardization. Perhaps it is possible in such worlds
to catch a momentary glimpse of a reconfigured, or better, a transfigured human being
in terms other than a cold, sterile epistemological subject of knowledge. This, as I have
suggested, calls for educators to turn to phenomenology and philosophers such as
Heidegger, Dreyfus, and Vandenberg for the insights afforded into original ways of
Being and learning, which might inspire both educators and students to "adopt a richer
ontology than the Cartesian one of minds and nature assumed by Husserl and Searle"
(Dreyfus, 1999, 24).
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